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Abstract 
Making decisions about optimal investments in green infrastructure necessitates setting social 
discount rates. This paper suggests a practical way for determining the discount rate for projects 
or programmes in which one of the options is to maintain or improve land in its natural state. 
We propose an “equivalency principle” to derive a simple rule that sets the discount rate. The 
rule is based on the premise that the long term value of a naturally preserved land track ought to 
be at least the same as the value of an identical land track in the vicinity to which permission has 
been granted for development.  We illustrate this principle with various case studies and we 
apply  it  to  a  contentious  investment  project  in  the  Basque  Country  associated  with  the 
regeneration of a large scale harbour in the province of Gipuzkoa (North of Spain) that involves 
reclaiming natural land that has important ecological value, including for the conservation of a 
marine ecosystem.  
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1. Introduction  
The discussion on discount rates is not new in the economic literature. Well-known economists 
such as Arrow (1963, 1965, 1996), Solow (1974), Sen (1967), Samuelson (1980), Lind (1982), 
Dasgupta, Maler and Barret (1999), Weitzman (2001) and Zeckhauser and Viscusi (2008) among 
many  others  have  devoted  great  efforts  to  understanding  how  economists  can  reconcile  the 
wellbeing of present and future generations. The debate on discounting is highly relevant in the 
context  of  climate  change  economics.  Both  the  celebrated  and  contentiously  argued  Stern‟s 
report (Stern et al.., 2007), supported the use of rates close to zero on the grounds that future 
generations might well not exist and this has triggered the reaction of scholars such as Nordhaus 
(2007) who argues in favour of higher rates and has provided potent criticisms to the values 
provided by the Stern report, in part due to the low discount rates used in the calculations. Tol 
and Yohe (2006, 2009) have suggested that Stern might be right but for the wrong reasons and 
that the use of low rates if time horizon is extended can increase damages very substantially.   
Generally, albeit the existing debate on discounting, there is some consensus by leading scholars 
supporting the case for rather low and also possibly declining discount rates when addressing the 
problem of climate change. As Weitzman (2007) pointed out “it is not an exaggeration to say 
that the biggest uncertainty of all in the economics of climate change is the uncertainty about 
which interest rate to use for discounting” The idea of using low social discount rates for natural 
resource management is not  new and has  been defended on various  grounds  and modelling 
exercises. Chichilnisky (1997) introduced two axioms for sustainable development, which, in 
combination,  require  that  neither  the  present  nor  the  future  should  play  a  dictatorial  role  in 
society‟s choices over time. The implications of her approach to discounting is that the future 
would be discounted in a conventional manner only in the “near future”, but after a point- the so-
called „switching date‟- remaining effects would not be discounted at all (i.e.  a zero rate will 
prevail). Li and Löfgren (2000) considered the case of two identical individuals, hence with 
identical preferences except for their personal rate of time preference.  In their model the overall 
societal objective is to maximize a weighted sum of utility for both individuals which results in a 
similar  outcome  to  that  of  Weitzman‟s  discounting  approach,  i.e,  the  individual  with  lower 
discount rate is  given the dominant weight as  time goes by and the collective discount rate 
declines over time.  5 
 
Further,  Weitzman  (2007  and  2008)  has  also  argued  that  even  negative  discount  rates  are 
possible when assessing the costs of climate change due to the high expected costs to future 
generations (albeit at low probability). More recently he has also recommended that discount 
rates decline over time toward the lowest possible value (Gollier and Weitzman, 2010)5. As said 
above, currently the discounting debate is especially relevant in the context of climate change, 
given the expected high costs that future generations are likely to bear based on past and current 
economic activities. Summers and Zeckhauser (2008) based on psychological principles have 
suggested  four  dimensions  for  climate  change  policies  and  defend  using  positive  but  low 
discount rates. Interestingly, Dasgupta (2008) has also argued that discount rates should be set 
based not only on economic forecasts but also on society´s conception of distributive justice 
“concerning the allocation of goods and services across personal identities, time and events” and 
points out that an optimum policy may well not exist. He also argues in favour of using rather 
low discount rates on the basis of the expected future income inequalities. Alternatively, Gollier 
(2008) has argued for a systematically declining discount rate justified on the basis of future 
shocks on economic growth going from ranges close to 4% for 100 years periods to 1-3.5% 
ranges for 1000 year periods. While this is an approach that is intuitively appealing the problem 
of time inconsistency is a thorny one since as Guo (2004) notes plans made at one point in time 
can be contradicted by later behaviour. Heal (1998) has shown that almost all types of declining 
discount rates result in time inconsistency.   
 The purpose of this paper is to make a practical proposal for determining the discount rate for 
projects or programmes in which one of the options is to maintain or improve land in its natural 
state. Making decisions about optimal investments in green infrastructure necessitates setting 
social discount rates. We illustrate this in the context of this special issue on valuation and 
management of marine ecosystems, for a case in the Basque Country where a contentious project 
to build a sea port involves reclaiming natural land that has ecological value for marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems.  
                                                           
5There is a problem with declining discount rates, namely the possibility of time inconsistency. „Time inconsistency‟ 
refers to the situation where plans made at one point in time are contradicted by later behaviour.  For example, as 
Guo (2004) notes, “if a government decides to use high discount rates for the near future but lower ones for the far 
future, the immediate large spending will be easily justified. However, when later governments review the policy, 
they may conclude that this earlier policy was not optimal and decide to increase the discount rate again, which will 
lead to higher consumption than planned.”   6 
 
 Economists working on such problems sooner or later have to deal with the difficult decision of 
choosing  an  appropriate  discount  rate  and  while  some  governments  now  offer  quite  precise 
advice, the issue is still controversial and does not have wide agreement
6.   
We  recommend an ethically  simple  and intuitively approach  that helps to  choose a  social 
discount rate when designing and evaluating land conservation options: the rule is based on the 
idea that any policy maker should try to value equivalently and consistently a track off land that 
is in its natural state and another one which has been designated as appropriate for development 
(namely with the permission to transform it to built up land, e.g., for residential use ). This is 
based on the idea that the long term value of a naturally preserved land track is at least equivalent 
to the value of  land with permission to  built up, and improvements to the former should be 
evaluated using a discount rate that has been determined o n the basis of this  “equivalency 
principle”.  
This assumption implies giving the same weight to both types of land, which in turn assumes that 
future generations would give the same importance (and the same economic value) to natural 
land and to the land for residential use, as a minimum. This statement has the advantage of 
avoiding  making  other  uncertain  assumptions  about  the  expected  welfare  or  growth  rate  of 
consumption  of  future  generation  (implied  in  the  Ramsey  rule),  and  the  magnitude  of  the 
projected impacts in the case of climate change for example (which might turn to be wrong in 
future realities). 
Section 2 makes the case for the calculation of appropriate discount rates for land-related assets 
taking  into  consideration  local  conditions  and  social  preferences.  Section  3  of  the  paper 
illustrates the proposed discounting rule with the information collected from several natural asset 
valuation studies. Section 4 applies the rule in a specific case for the Basque Country.  Finally, 
section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
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2. Implications for discounting of the equivalency principle 
For heuristic purposes, let us assume the following situation that in time period zero (t=0) there 
are two tracks of land of identical size, e.g., one hectare, named N and U, both with identical 
environmental and site-characteristic attributes such as location, slope, orientation, proximity to 
infrastructures, etc. In this case the value of N and U would be equal, and it could be represented 
by a price PN and PU if a land market exists, i.e,  . Now let us assume that in the future 
(t=1) an administrative procedure is granted so that track U now has the right to be built upon. U 
becomes a land with the potential to be developed while N stays natural. That is, U is granted the 
possibility to  have industrial, commercial or residential  construction. This  will automatically 
increase the market price of U significantly (maybe 10 to 20 times higher). Thus,   
This  situation  is  relatively  common  in  most  countries  where  a  “well  informed”  government 
decides to grant building rights to different pieces of land. When this occurs, decisions about 
either tract of land will be heavily influenced by the higher value attached to U. Taking into 
account future generations opens the discussion on the discount rate that should be used for this 
purpose. If both tracks of land remain under the same use in the future, the value for future 
generations of both N and U would be equal. If instead they stay forever as in t=1 the market 
interest rate will play a role for the calculation of the present value of U. But it is not so clear 
which  is  the  discount  rate  that  should  be  applied  to  value  N  as  the  market  is  unlikely  to 
internalize important environmental values.  
While for U the market interest rate is normally used to discount future costs and benefits from 
any investment associated with it, for N the question is which discount rate should be used. What 
this paper proposes is a basic rule to calculate the discount rate that should be used when valuing 
natural  assets.  We  argue  that  the  discount  rate  to  be  used  for  N  in  any  analysis  is  the  one 
resulting  from  assuming  the  same  present  value  for  both  N  and  U.  This  is  the  equivalency 
principle. The value for U is PU, i.e, the price per hectare observed in the market. For N, which 
has environmental values not traded in the market, this value is usually calculated using non-
market valuation methods and is represented by the present value PVN per hectare. The type of 
land which we refer to in our analysis is the undeveloped residential land.  8 
 
Using the conventional discounting formula for the present value: 
 
(1) 
Where PVN is the present value, i.e. the discounted value of the benefit in year t, VN is the benefit 
in year t, expressed in terms of annual value per hectare (flow) of N, and iN is the discount rate 
for  natural  assets.  However,  lands  generate  benefits  in  perpetuity,  so  that  the  appropriate 
discounting formula for infinite time scale should be used (Mills et al., 1994): 
 
(2) 
The equation assumes that the benefits are constant over time. However, flows can be expected 
to increase over time in real terms as a result of growing real incomes and an increasing scarcity 
of services from natural capital (Krutilla, 1967). Furthermore, educational improvement in the 
future might lead to a higher appreciation of the use of natural land (Barker, 2006). In this case, 
the present value for a finite time scale would be: 
 
(3) 
Where g stands for the growth rate or appreciation of the benefits of the natural land over time. 
Consequently, equation (1) for a perpetuity becomes: 
 
(4) 
The flow of benefits for N includes both use and non-use values taken from stated or revealed 
preference approaches. Use values are derived for example from the individual willingness to 
pay to visit the natural site (contingent valuation or choice experiments) or from the households‟ 
expenses actually supported for the visit (travel cost). Non-use values are expressed in terms of 
the willingness to pay to protect the natural asset and preserve its biodiversity level (existence 
value). 9 
 
The calculation of i*N, using the conventional discount formula (equation 1), relies on numerical 
or graphical methods, being based on the same conceptual framework of the IRR. i*N is the 
discount rate at which the present value of the natural assets equals the price of the land for 
residential use (with permission to build).  If t=1, equation (1) can be written as: 
 
(1‟) 
and  olving for  : 
 
(1‟‟) 
For any number of time periods t, the sequence of discounted flow values of N is a polynomial 
function with n degree, so that finding i*N that equates PU and PVN requires us to find the roots of 
the polynomial. Different methods can be used for this purpose, such as the linear interpolation 
using trials and error methods or the Newton-Raphson method. The first allows is simpler but 
allows only an approximation of the discount rate, while the second uses algorithms to find 
successively improved approximations to the roots of the function (Tjalling and Ypma, 1995). 




3. Illustrating the equivalency rule to existing valuation studies 
In order to illustrate the application of the equivalency rule we have identified a number of case 
studies from peer reviewed published papers, conducted in different regions, excluding those 
from developing countries, and that contain explicit and detailed information about annual non-
market values per hectare (TEV) for different types of habitats.  
The  TEV  is  taken  as  an  annual  flow  value  for  a  specific  point  in  time.    In  some  cases, 
expectations of changes in this value over time are given.  Since due to economic growth or 10 
 
associated scarcity of the selected habitats people in the future might be willing to pay more for 
the benefits of preserving those habitats, an exogenous growth rate of the TEV associated with 
the growth rate of real per capita income has been introduced. Hence we apply the equivalency 
rule to calculate the implicit discount rate that ought to be applied to the management of natural 
habitats under two assumptions: (a) that future flow values are equal to the present ones and (b) 
future flow values grow at the rate of expected growth or real per capita incomes (for this we 
have used the A2 and B2 IPPC scenarios). For simplicity we have not included the effect of the 
income elasticity of the WTP.  
For  each  case  study  we  have  estimated  the  discount  rate  i*N  that  would  result  from  the 
application of the suggested rule, using equation 5 (for the perpetuity case). As regards the price 
of the land for residential use, this should be equal to the average price observed in the market 
for the residential land located in the vicinity of the case study site. In the first two case studies, 
located in the Basque Country (North of Spain), we used the average price of residential land for 
the coastal Basque province of Gipuzkoa (where the two studies are located),  excluding the 
cities, equal to 5.4 million €2000 (Basque Government, 2004). In the other case studies, we used 
as a first attempt the average price of residential land estimated at national level. For United 
Kingdom we refer to Property Market Report 2006 (Valuation Office Agency), while for the 
countries located in the United States we refer to Morris and Heathcote (2007) providing prices 
of residential land for 50 US states and the District of Columbia
7. The estimated discount rate for 
each case study is reported in Table 1 here below. 
[TABLE 1] 
The estimated discount rate depends on the  magnitude of the original annual  non-market value 
per hectare, on the average price per hectare of the land for residential use in the vicinity and on 
the expected growth rate of per capita income.  In the reported case studies, the discount rate is 
generally very small. When using constant flows, the estimated discount rate is lower compared 
to the two alternative scenarios which take into account an increase in the real GDP. It should be 
noted, however, that in some cases the WTP   for habitat  conservation  might be quite high, 
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the study site. If more sites are under analysis, located in a broader geographical area, then the average price of 
residential land for that area should be use. 11 
 
especially when such habitat is rare. Under the equivalency rule high discount rates, e.g., above 
four percent (an often cited threshold for the social rate of discount, see e.g., Gollier, 2010, may 
result. This supposes a paradox as any future investment for the conservation of such sites would 
be heavily discounted in the future. We suggest that is such cases valuation as a way to inform 
policy may give way to the precautionary principle instead, whereby monetary valuation does 
not play a fundamental role in policy decision making.  
The Total Economic Value per hectare reported from stated or revealed preferences depend on 
many  factors,  such  as  the  site  physical  characteristics  (biome,  habitat),  the  socio-economic 
variables (income per capita, population, etc), the relative importance of the different types of 
benefits  (use  and  non-use),  as  well  as  the  valuation  method  used.  All  these  variables  are 
influencing the values per hectare which are very site-specific. The appropriate non-market value 
to be used for a natural site should therefore be selected taking into account the context-specific 
variables  identifying  the  territory  (site  and  socio-economic  characteristics).  This  requires  a 
specific knowledge of the territory at a local level. The proposed method to identify the discount 
rate for natural assets is therefore based on the individual preferences which in turn depend on 
the site characteristics and the socio-demographic features of the area.  
We suggest the following steps to estimate the appropriate discount rate. First, we have to select 
the most suitable case study which should be representative of the territory under analysis (in 
terms of habitats). The selection should take into account only TEVs or good approximation of 
TEV. Second, we need to identify the average price of residential land in the same territory, 
which  should  be  the  closest  as  possible  to  the  case  study  site.  Third,  we  need  to  make  an 
assumption of the rate of growth of future flows of services from the land. Based on these we 
calculate the discount rate at which the present value of the natural site equals the average price 
of the land for residential use. This discount rate can be used then in all the choices concerning 






4. An illustration from the Basque Coast 
The construction of a new seaport in Pasaia (Gipuzkoa) is attracting a lot of attention lately as it 
is projected in a cliff with significant environmental attributes named Jaizkibel. This is a zone 
that was incorporated in Natura 2000 network in 2004 and comprises 2400 ha of natural land 
with 15 zones declared of high ecological interest. The project is currently been evaluated by the 
Ministry of the Environment, Rural Affairs and Marine Issues of the Spanish Government within 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure. The total investment (of mainly public 
resources)  needed  to  go  ahead  with  the  project  ranges  from  €750  million  to  €1.2  billion 
depending on the alternative chosen. The information for this case study has been obtained from 
the Environmental Sustainability Report (Informe de Sostenibilidad Ambiental, ISA 2010) that 
has been submitted for the EIA procedure by the Pasaia Port Authority. These documents are 
available at the official site of the Port Authority. Two other research papers have also been used 
for this case-study, Hoyos et al (2008) and Hoyos et al (2009).  
The high environmental value of the Jaizkibel area is very well summarised in Hoyos  et al 
(2009), who define the landscape as: “[...] highly valuable because the mountain runs along the 
coast with an abrupt fall at the western end, with cliffs up to 240mhigh. In these cliffs, which are 
geologically  highly  valued  because  of  the  layout  of  the  sandy  strata,  lives  the  Armeria 
euskadiensis, an endemic plant of the Basque coast catalogued as being in danger of extinction. 
At the eastern end, the terrain is not so abrupt and there are small beaches and gullies formed by 
the courses of streams flowing into the Bay of Biscay. In these areas, interesting species of flora 
can be found such as tropical ferns (Woodwardia radicans and Trichomanes speciosum), which 
are extremely rare in the rest of Europe. The rest of Mount Jaizkibel comprises a non-wooded 
forest area with some scrubland and pasture land associated with local „baserris‟ (family-run 
farms). Nevertheless, some areas maintain their original tree cover with groves of Quercus robur 
and  Quercus  pyrenaica  oaks.  Colonies  of  lesser  black-backed  gulls  and  yellow-legged  gulls 
(Larus  fuscus  and  Larus  cachinnans)  nest  on  the  cliffs.  Other  interesting  birds  such  as  the 
European storm petrel (Hydrobates pelagicus), the green cormorant (Phalacrocorax aristotelis) 
and  the  peregrine  falcon  (Falco  peregrinus)  can  also  be  found  in  this  natural  area.  On  the 
mainland,  there  are  numerous  species  of  amphibians,  reptiles  and  mammals  including  the 
palmate newt (Triturus helveticus), the midwife toad (Alytes obstetricans), the dark-green whip 13 
 
snake (Coluber viridiflavus) and the greater horseshoe bat (Rhinolophus ferrumequinun). The 
seabed harbours different types of molluscs, sea urchins and crustaceans, as well as some species 
of fish and dolphins. The seabed in the area is also home to various types of green, red and 
brown seaweed, and one of the most important patches of red seaweed on the Basque coast. In 
short, Jaizkibel's most outstanding environmental attributes are its landscape, its autochthonous 
fauna and flora and its seabed life”.  
Hoyos  et  al  (2008)  estimated,  using  a  choice  modelling  exercise,  the  economic  value  of 
preserving the Jaizkibel natural area in similar condition as it is today. The study determines that 
it will directly depend on the environmental damage that the construction of the projected sea-
port will generate. The higher the expected damage the greater the willingness to pay to preserve 
the area. With this purpose the paper defines three scenarios of potential damage (high, medium 
and low). The results show that the social welfare loss per year for a low damage scenario was 
estimated  in  €172,110,000,  while  a  medium  damage  scenario  will  provoke  a  loss  of 
€344,220,000 and a high damages one a loss of €535,520,000. This is the information that will 
be used in this case study as the environmental (social) cost of the project. 
On  the  other  side,  information  on  the  total  economic  impact  of  building  the  recommended 
alternative for the port (namely alternative 4
8) is available from the ISA (2010). The report states 
that building the port will generate a positive net impact of €542,686,980 annually for the period 
2010-2054
9. The figure has been estimated applying an input -output Leontieff model, and fall 
within the ranges of a similar study carried out by the Bilbao Port Authority
10. 
With these pieces of information one can derive a very sim ple Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to 
illustrate the methodology proposed in this paper showing how the election of the discount rates 
proves to be essential for an evaluation exercise such as this one.  
If the public authorities need to make a decision wheth er to build the port or not, one could 
expect that the expected economic benefits of the project (in this case the total economic impact) 
could be compared to environmental cost. To illustrate our point we assume that the authority 
decides to discount the economic benefits at a market rate (let us assume it is  11%) to calculate 
                                                           
8 The other alternatives are 3,2,1 and 0 which represents not building the port at all. 
9 This value is net of the investment cost needed to build the port and the infrastructures. 
10 http://www.bilbaoport.es/aPBW/web/es/puerto/economia/index.jsp 14 
 
the present value of expected benefits for the period 2010-2054 and uses the same rate for the 
welfare losses. The resulting values are given in the first line of table 2 below. For the three 
scenarios of the environmental cost the present value of the benefits (€5.4 bill) is higher than the 
present value of the expected environmental cost (€1.7 billion, €3.4 billion and €5.3 billion) and 
consequently, building the port would be justified. The total impact of the project (i.e. economic 
cost minus environmental cost) will be €3.7 bill, €1.9 bill and €71 mill for the three scenarios 
(see table 3). 
[TABLE 2] 
However, if a well informed policy maker decides to use different discount rates to calculate the 
present value of the benefits from the one that would use to obtain the present value costs the 
story changes. Let us assume that following the ranges suggested by Gollier (2008) a 4% rate is 
used for environmental costs while 11% is used for the economic benefits. Then the CBA shows 
that only under the scenario of low impact would it be justified to opt for the construction of the 
port. This indeed makes a big difference the result of the analysis and therefore on the viability 
of the project.  
[TABLE 3] 
Let us move now one step further to illustrate the case of choosing the discount rates resulting 
from the method suggested in the paper. In this case, the estimated discount rate for low impact 
scenario (that is the one resulting from the rule of thumb) would be 1.31% (Table 2, using 
constant flows). Consequently the total impact will change dramatically to a loss of €473 mill. 
The other two scenarios require using a 2.6% and a close to 4% rates and will also generate a 
negative result. 
The numbers showed here easily illustrate the case, choosing a wrong discount rate makes that 
the traditional CBA are totally biased, suggesting that a project should be promoted when a 
closer look at the values of nature assets strongly suggest not to undertake it. These numbers are 
real numbers from a future project that it is been discussed at policy arena for the past few years. 
Deciding to go ahead with this project is pending on an administrative procedure. Short sighted 
policy makers could decide to go ahead with a €750 million investment while a more sustainable 
approach clearly shows that the port should not be constructed. 15 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Identifying  the  appropriate  social  discount  rate  is  crucial  for  policy  action  especially  in  the 
context  of  long-term  environmental  impacts.  Two  critical  arguments  should  be  taken  into 
account in the discussion about the choice of the discount rate in intergenerational choices about 
the environment. The estimation of the discount rate in the welfare approach is based on the fact 
that future generation will be richer than ours, according to which “one should not be ready to 
pay one euro to reduce the loss borne by future generations by one euro, given that these future 
generations will be so much wealthier than us” (as mentioned by Gollier, 2008). However, in the 
current situation of uncertainty, we cannot say with certainty that global GDP is expected to 
continue to rise over time. In this context, the definition of the discount rate cannot be based on 
expectations about future economic growth alone. Second, according to the decreasing marginal 
utility theory, if a resource becomes scarcer, its value is expected to raise compared to the less 
scarce  resources.  Some  natural  ecosystems  (such  as  wetlands,  mangroves,  coral  reefs)  can 
become  very  rare  in  the  future,  and  this  would  increase  their  value  and  the  price  of  the 
corresponding land. In the most extreme case that human life would be threatened due to the 
disappearance of critical natural ecosystems, the value of these ecosystems might see a dramatic 
escalation, to the point of reaching some critical threshold where the notion of economic value 
itself would become meaningless. In a situation of higher scarcity of natural resources in the 
future, if the  governments  would be willing to  invest  in these resources  for protecting  their 
natural ecosystem, they will have to pay a much higher price. So we can reasonably think that 
low social discount rates (giving today high present values) could be reflected in higher actual 
prices of natural lands in the future. 
What we propose in this paper simplifies the discussion about which discount rate should be 
used  by  policy  makers  under  the  current  level  of  uncertainty  characterising  climate  change 
impacts  and  long-term  risks  to  future  generations.  While  the  current  “main  intellectual 
battleground is whether we should be using discount rates in the range of 3% or discounting by 
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Table 1. Estimated discount rates for different case studies based on the equivalency principle. 
Study 
 































Sandy and shingle 
beaches 
5,418,912  8,415 
 
1.55  3.03  2.61 








(Natura 2000) : cliffs 
sandy strata, 
beaches/gullies, non-
wooded forest area, 
crubland/pasture 
5,418,912  70,518  
(lower bound WTP) 
1.3  2.79    2.35 
        141,034  
(medium bound 
WTP) 
2.6  4.09    3.65 
        219,417  
(upper bound WTP) 






Forest ancient wood 
(small with few 
substitutes) 





Scotland  Mar Lodge Estate, 
Scottish Highlands 
3,716,471  1,629  0.044  1.53  1.095   
Jacobs 
(2004) 
Scotland  7  NK2 sites (Natura 
2000) 






Forested area  3,716,471  175  0.0047  1.4903  1.0556 
Costanza 
(1997) 




USA  Wetlands  437,263  9,496  2.17  3.65  3.22 
Phillips and  
Silverman 
(2007) 
Alaska  Primary, old-growth 
temperate rainforest 









Economic benefit € (2010-2054) 
11%  5,426,207,784 




LOW  MEDIUM  HIGH 
11%  1,720,890,045  3,441,780,091  5,354,546,727 
4%  3,708,771,075  7,417,542,150  11,539,835,489 
1.31%  5,900,026,689  n.a  n.a 
2.60%  n.a  9,304,090,225  n.a 




Table 3: Total impact of constructing the port, a basic CBA approach 
  TOTAL IMPACT (economic & environmental) 
Discount rate for costs  Low  Medium  High 
11%  3,705,317,738  1,984,427,693  71,661,057 
4%  1,717,436,709  -1,991,334,366  -6,113,627,705 
1.31%  -473,818,905  n.a  n.a 
2.60%  n.a  -3,877,882,441  n.a 
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